(Economic) voting before and in a crisis (economic and political): The Icelandic elections 2007 and 2009

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Authors:

Eva Heida Onnudottir
PhD student
CDSSMannheim University

Olafur Th. Hardarson
Professor
University of Iceland

Abstract:

The global credit crunch 2008 paralysed the Icelandic economy and it was one the first countries to be bailed out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A political crisis followed, resulting in, among other things, an early election in 2009. The economic as well as the political crisis are now considered as landmark events in the country's democratic history. In this paper we distinguish between the effects of the economic crisis and of the political crisis on vote choice. Using data from the Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES) we find that economic matters were indeed important in the 2009 election and economic voting did increase due to the economic recession. However, what we find more interesting is that the voters' psychological and ideological attachment to parties did have a lesser effect on the vote in 2009 compared to 2007. We argue that it did so because of the political crisis – a crisis which seems to this day still to have considerable effects on Icelandic politics.

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Introduction

The 2009 election in Iceland was an early election followed by major protests and a political crisis that was triggered by the global credit crunch which had paralyzed the Icelandic economy. Bellucci et al. (2012) point out that the world economic crisis in 2008 challenged the capacity of national government to steer national economies. This was specifically so if intervention of financial international institutions was sought and carried out, as was the case in Iceland as the first country to be bailed out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) late 2008.

A general question on economic voting raised by Lewis-Beck et al. (2012) is whether economic voting has increased because of the economic crisis; or if government accountability is weakened because of economic globalization. The answer to their first question could seem as obviously being yes, economic voting has increased because of the economic crisis. However, as Marsh and Mikhaylow (2012) point out, the relationship between economic conditions and vote choice is not deterministic. When examining the effect of economic conditions on the vote, whether subjective or objective, it has to be taken into account whether voters blame or praise parties or governments for their performance, whether they believe them to be competent – and most important of all, who the voters hold accountable for the economy and its management. In this sense, the economic conditions are part of a context of an election, not a deterministic cause of vote choice.

In this paper we examine whether economic voting increased in Iceland after the economic recession. We also disentangle the effect of the economic crisis from the effect of the political crisis that was triggered by the recession. We hypothesize that the economic crisis led to an increase in economic voting, using voters' subjective evaluation of economic matters. However, what we perhaps find more interesting is whether the political crisis that followed, led to erosion in voters psychological and ideological attachment to parties resulting in decreased effects of party identification, left-right distance and party sympathy on vote choice.

For the purpose of this research we compare the 2007 election to the 2009 election in Iceland. The 2007 election was held a little over a year before the recession and the 2009 election within half a year after the recession hit the country. Examining two elections this close to each other, gives validity to the claim that changes detected in voting behavior can be traced back to the to the economic recession and the political crisis. At the end we examine the 2009 election specifically, and to what accent the blame for the mismanagement of the

economic crisis and the belief in what party had the best policy to deal with the crisis determined the vote.

The context

The Icelandic economy was one of the first western countries that were bailed out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with the first payment made available late 2008 (Anderson 2008). The three major banks in Iceland, who all had big operations abroad, but were regulated and insured by the Icelandic state, collapsed and were taken into public ownership (Danielsson and Zoega 2009). Currency restriction was imposed late 2008 (Althingi 2008), unemployment rose from 2.4% in April 2008 to 7.3% in April 2009 (Statistics Iceland 2013) and inflation went from 5.8% in January 2008 to 18.6% in January 2009 (Central Bank of Iceland n.d.). Weekly protests in front of the Parliamentary building started early October 2008 (Onnudottir and Hardaron 2010). The main demands of the protesters were that the government should resign and an early election should be called, that the board of governors of the Central Bank should resign, as well as the board of directors and the CEO of the Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority. At first it seemed that the government was intent on ignoring the protesters, but the protest only escalated in size and noise, and into outbreaks of riots. The protest did not come to an end until late January with all the demands of protesters met.

The following 2009 election seems to be a classic case of economic voting. Support for the Independence Party (IP), the leading party in the incumbent government coalition, went from 36.6% in 2007 to 23.7% in the 2009 election (Statistics Iceland 2010). The IP, a right wing conservative party, had been a governing party for 18 years (since 1991). Out of those 18 years its coalition partner was the Progressive Party (PP- a center party) for 12 years, from 1995 to 2007. In 2007 IP formed a coalition with the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA(a social democratic party)). In the 2009 election SDA did not suffer the same loss as the IP in the election. Quite the opposite, it gained support – although modestly– going from 26.8% in 2007 to 29.8% in 2009. Following the election SDA formed a coalition with the Left Green Movement (LGM – left party) (Rikisstjorn.is 2009), leaving the IP in the opposition. This raises the question on whether voters solely blamed the IP and not its coalition partner for its performance before the crisis hit and its reaction to the crisis in the fall 2008. Was IP held "more" responsible because of its long history of being the main governing party since 1991?

The economic and political crisis had numerous other consequences and here we name a few examples. In October 2008 the British authorities used an anti-terrorist law to take control of Icelandic banks in the UK ("U.K. Used Anti-Terrorism Law", 2008 and Mason, 2009). The EFTA Surveillance Authority took Iceland to the EFTA court over a breach of the Deposit Guarantee Directive in late 2011 (EFTA Surveillance Authority, 2011) after a diplomatic dispute between the Icelandic authorities and the authorities of the UK and the Netherlands about terms of refunding of money that the British and Dutch authorities used to reimburse the depositors of the so-called Icesave deposits offered by an Icelandic bank online ("*UK, Netherlands taxpayers",* 2011). The EFTA ruled in the favour of Icelandic authorities in February this year. The Icelandic Parliament charged the former prime minister, Geir H. Haarde, with negligence over failure to prevent or mitigate the collapse of the Icelandic banks ("Landsdómur", n.d.) and found guilty in one count out of four (Alþingi gegn Geir Hilmari Haarde, 2012) by a "parliamentary court".

Economic voting before and in and economic crisis

Since the crisis, country studies on the impact of economic voting differ in their conclusions on the impact of the crisis. Anderson and Hecht (2012) find limited support for economic voting in the 2009 German election. They suggest that it is because voters did not blame the incumbent government for the economic conditions in Germany. However they find that voters who had personally experienced economic hardship had a tendency to shift their support from the governing parties to the Left Party. This they argue to be a form of protest voting regardless of whether the Left Party was considered a viable option in a government coalition. In the 2011 Irish election, the governing party Fianna Fáil support went from 41.6% in 2007 to 17.4% in 2011. The 2011 election was held just three months after the country had agreed to the terms with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) (Marsh and Mikhaylov 2012). While the 2011 Irish election seems to be a classic example of economic voting, Marsh and Mihaylow (2012) conclude that it was not just the economy; it was the blame that voters asserted to Fianna Fáil for its performance.

Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2012) suggest explanation in a similar vein for a difference they find between northern and southern European economies. In the south, economic performance is more important to electors when they vote for a party, compared to the north. This they say is because economies in the south are not functioning as well as those in the north. That makes the electorate in the south more sensitive to economic conditions as there is

more at stake in those countries that the government performs well controlling the economy, specifically when the economic goes bad. Stronger emphasis on the economy in the south is because the government coalitions there are not as complex as in the north, making it easier for voters in there to reward or punish governments for their performance.

It is clear from studies on the effect of the economy on the vote, that the clarity of responsibility of the economy is important. From that it can be derived that it is important to establish who voters hold accountable for the economy. Bellucci et al. (2012) point out that it is crucial to understand whether voters rely on retrospective or prospective evaluations of government performance, to understand the impact of the economy on the vote. In practice retrospective and prospective evaluations of performance are intermingled. If voters perceive the incumbent government performance as bad, it is quite possible that it contaminates their evaluation of the incumbent government parties' prospective competence. If a party's past performance following up to an economic crisis is perceived negatively, voters' are less likely to believe that this party has the best policy to get the country out of the crisis.

Bellucci et al. (2012) say that in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Turkey there is an increasing trend of economic voting and increasing effect of accountability on vote choice. Apart from Turkey, this trend might be countered by the growing involvement of the institutions of the European Union (EU) on the national economies of its member-states. For Iceland, which is a small state and not an EU-country, the question on accountability is not about who was to blame for the economic crisis in Iceland. Rather it is about who was to blame for how severely the recession hit the country and how the governing parties managed the crisis. The growing accountability found on the mainland of Europe with increasing economic voting which is countered by increasing economic globalization is hardly applicable to the Icelandic case. Rather it could be that in Iceland accountability becomes more specified to how the economy is managed and who has the mandate to manage it in a globalized economic environment.

As has already been stated the Icelandic economy was hit especially hard by the global credit crunch and the political events (i.e. protests, resignations and court cases) that followed are landmark events in the country's history. The country experienced both an economic crisis and a political crisis. Focusing first on the economic crisis we hypothesize that because of the economic collapse, economic subjective perceptions had a stronger effect on the vote in 2009 after the recession, compared to 2007, two years before the recession. We also hypothesise that party's perceived competence to deal with the most important political task determined the vote to a greater extent in 2009 compared to 2007:

H1: Because of the economic crisis the parties' policy about economic matters (taxes) had a stronger effect on vote-choice in the 2009 election compared to the 2007 election.

H2: Because of the economic crisis parties' competence to deal with the most important political problem was more important as a determinant of the vote in the 2009 election compared to the 2007 election.

Second, we look into whether the political crisis that was triggered by the economic recession, led to erosion in voters attachment with the parties. That is, was party identification a less important determinant of the vote in 2009 compared to 2007? Did the perceived distance between voters and the parties on left-right decrease in importance explaining the vote? Did voters' sympathy towards parties (like/dislike) weaken as an effect on vote choice between the 2007 and 2009 election?

H3: Because of the political crisis (triggered by the economic crisis), voters attachment to political parties; party identification, perceived distance between voters and parties on left right, and party sympathy decreased in importance as a determinants of vote choice from 2007 to 2009.

At the end we examine the 2009 election only and to what extent voters blame assigned to parties' for the economy and what party they believed to have the best policy about the economy / economic recovery, explained their vote choice:

H4: The more a party was blamed for the economic recession, the less likely voters were to vote for that party.

H5: If voters believed a party to have the best policy for the economic recovery, the more likely they were to vote for that party.

Research design

The data used in this paper is the Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES) from 2007 and 2009 (ICENES n.d.). Both studies were carried out after the general election each year using a

random sample of 2600 voters in Iceland. Response rate in 2007 was 61.7%, and 56.9% in 2009.

In order to examine vote choice we use stacked data matrixes. By stacking the data it is possible to analyse how explanatory variables affect the vote-choice without examining party specifics (van der Brug et al. 2007). That is, instead of examining what affects the vote for each individual party, the dependent variable is vote choice – not party choice. Stacked data matrix makes this possible, because by that we can examine respondents' evaluations of parties which are nested within respondents.

Original dataset

respondent	Age	left-right distance from party A	left-right distance from party B	left-right distance from party C	Vote choice
1	59	1,5	2,7	2,8	1
2	40	1,4	1,2	1,6	2
3	22	2,2	2,1	1,8	3

Stacked dataset

respondent	Age	Party id	Left-right distance	Vote choice (1=yes, 0=no)
1	59	1	1,5	1
1	59	2	2,7	0
1	59	3	2,8	0
2	40	1	1,4	0
2	40	2	1,2	1
2	40	3	1,6	0
3	22	1	2,2	0
3	22	2	2,1	0
3	22	3	1,8	1

Figure 1. Example of a stacked data matrix.

Figure 1 shows a hypothetical example of a transformation from an original data matrix to a stacked data matrix. Transforming an original dataset into a stacked data set means that respondents' evaluation of all the relevant parties are used to predict his vote choice. In the hypothetical sample in figure 3, there are three relevant parties. The three parties form three party stacks in the stacked data set – one stack for each party. Other party variables, such as party identification, party sympathy and left-right distances are stacked as well. By that it is made possible to analyse how for example left-right distance with each party effects respondents vote-choice in a single model. In the end the results are interpreted as what factors, such as left-right distance, predict the vote choice in general – not focusing on what factors predict the vote for specific parties.

Determinants of the vote before and in a crisis

Descriptives

In this section we explain and describe the explanatory variables for vote choice. At this stage we have included the descriptives, where applicable, from two earlier elections, 2003 and 1999. The reason is that we want to look into (even if we do not test for it as this stage) whether there could possibly be a general trend dating further back than 2007.

Best policy about taxes

The only variable that asks about parties and economic matters that is available both in 2007 and in 2009, is about what party has the best policy about taxes. Figure 1 shows the proportion of parties mentioned each year. It can be seen that the IP, the leading party in the government coalition up until 2009, is losing most of its credits compared to the other parties. In 2007 a little over half of respondents named the IP party as the one with the best policy about taxes. In 2009 this proportion drops to 31%. IP's coalition party, the SDA, does not seem to lose any credit, about one in every four names that party as the one with the best tax policy both years. Parties, who seem to be gaining credit about tax poly, are PP and LGM, both opposition parties between 2007 and 2009.


Figure 1. Which party has the best policy about taxes

The most important political problem and the best party to deal with that problem (party's competence)

To estimate parties' perceived competence, respondents are first asked what is the most important political task the country is faced with, and next which party is the best one to deal with this task. The replies are open ended. We recode the replies into 0 and 1, assigning 1 to those who said that the economy or financial matters were the most important problem and 0 to those who mentioned other matters (or did not name any specific problem). The question about the most important problem has been asked in ICENES since 1999 and on figure 2, one can see the proportion of respondents who name the economy as the most important problems since 1999. The general trend between 1999 and 2007 is that economic matters are considered less important each year. However and not surprisingly, in 2009 an overwhelming majority of voters considered the economy to be the most important problem with approximately three in every four respondents naming economic matters.


Figure 2. The proportion who say that the economy is the most important problem. 1999-2009.

In 2007 and 2009, respondents who named a most important political problem were asked which party was the best one to deal with it. Before the economic crisis (2007), 69% of those who regarded the economy as the most important political task named IP as the best party to deal with it, but in 2009 that proportion was down to 24%. All other parties that were running both years were named proportionally more often in 2009 compared to 2007 as the best one to deal with the most important task.

Figure 3. Which party is the best one to deal with the most important political task.

Party identification

Respondents are in ICENES, asked about whether they do identify with a party, the strength of party identification and direction (what party). Figure 2 shows the proportion of party identifiers for each party, out of the total number of respondents for four elections from 1999 to 2009 (1999, 2003, 2007 and 2009). As can be seen, the IP has been losing party identifiers from 1999, while the SDA and LGM have been gaining them. Party identifiers for the PP have been pretty stable and under 10%. Less than 2% of voters identify with the two smallest parties, the Civic Movement in 2009 and the Liberal Party in the other three years. The strength of party identification is asked on a 3 point scale (1=low party identification, 3=high party identification). Together with the question whether the respondents do identify with a party, a variable is created for each party on a four point scale; 0=does not identify with the party, 0.33=low party identification, 0.66=somewhat identifies and 1.0=high party identification. Even if the proportion of party identifiers has changed to some extent between 1999 and 2009 for each party, the strength has not changed much for those who do identify with a party. In all years, for all parties, the mean strength (on a scale 0.33 to 1.00) of party identification is stable around .7 to .8 (data not shown).

Figure 4. Party identification. 1999-2009

Party sympathy

Respondents were asked to rate how much they liked or disliked, on a scale from zero to ten, each of the five political party who did get elected. Figure 4 shows the means of party sympathy (rescaled to 0=dislike to 1=like) for each party from 1999 to 2009. Both incumbent government parties in 2009, the IP and SDA (grey lines), are less liked that year compared to before. PP and LGM (black and bolded lines), both from opposition between 2007 and 2009, are liked more in 2009 compared to 2007.


Figure 5. Party sympathy. 1999-2009. (0=dislike, 1=like – ten point scale).

Left-right distance between voters and parties

Respondents were asked about their own left-right position on a scale from 0 to 10 (0=left, 10=right), as well as placing the parties on the same scale. The responses were rescaled to 0 and 1 (0=left, 1=right). From those two measures, we calculate the distance of each respondent from each party. In figure 3 we have plotted the mean left-right distance of respondents from each of the parties elected from 1999 to 2009. The main message is that left-right distance seems not to have changed overall in this time span.


Figure 6. Left-right distance to political parties. 1999-2009. (0=close, 1=far)

Responsibility for the financial crisis

For retrospective evaluation of the parties responsibility for the economic crisis, respondents were asked in 2009 how much each of the four main parties that was in the parliament from 2007 to 2009, was responsible for the economic crisis. The scale was from 0 to 10 (0=no responsibility, 10=great responsibility). In figure 3, the means for each party are plotted. Respondents' assign most responsibility to IP (8.2). It is notable that respondents assign more responsibility to the IP's old coalition partner, the PP (1995-2007), compared its coalition partner when the crisis hit in 2008 (SDA).

A new party, the Civic Movement (CM), got elected as well. Obviously respondents were not asked about how responsible CM was for the crisis – as it was found just before the

election. Because of that we assign the value 0 to the CM's responsibility for the crisis, when we run the regression below.

Figure 7. Responsibility for the financial crisis

Best party for economic recovery

Respondents prospective evaluation of what party has the best policy on economic recovery in the 2009 study, was simply to name the party they believed to have the best policy on that. Figure 8 shows that parties named the most often and second most often, are both the old government parties since the crisis; 34% name the SDA and 27% the IP.

Figure 8. What party has the best policy about economic recovery

Social and economic background

In our analysis we control for social and economic status of the respondents. For that we use information about respondents' gender, age, marital status, church attendance, education, income, whether respondent live in the capital area or not, union-membership, whether respondents works in the private or public sector and his occupation. Instead of including all those variables separately into the model, we regress them on vote choice and use the y-hats as indicators for respondents' social economic status. The results for these two regressions (2007 and 2009) can be seen in Appendix I.

Economy and the vote 2007 and 2009

In order to examine changes in voting behavior from the 2007 to the 2009 election, we pool the two stacked datasets for 2007 and 2009. We use binary logistic regression to estimate the effect of the perception of what party has the best tax policy, party competence, party identification, left-right distance and party sympathy on vote-choice. We interact each factor with election year, coding 2009 as 1 and 2007 as 0. Significant interaction terms indicate that the effect of the explanatory variable in question has changed between those two elections. If the direction of the interaction effect is the same as the main effect, then the factor in question has a stronger effect on vote-choice in 2009. If the estimator for the interaction variable has an opposite sign compared to the main effect, the factor in question has lesser effect on vote-choice in 2009 compared to 2007. We run three binary logistic regression models. In the first model we only include whether the party has the best policy on taxes, an interaction term of that variable with year and respondents socio-economic status. In the second model we add party competence and interaction term with election year. In the third and final model we add voters' attachment to parties; party identification, left-right distances with party and party sympathy as well as interaction terms for each with election year.

As can be seen in table 1, respondents' perception of what party has the best tax policy has a stronger effect on the vote in 2009 compared to 2007 in all three models, supporting hypothesis 1. Party competence also had a stronger effect on vote-choice when added in the second model and that holds in the third model, supporting hypothesis 2. Adding respondents' attachment to parties in the third model, shows that they all had a lesser effect on vote-choice in 2009 supporting hypothesis 3. Taken together, our models in table 1 do support that economic voting increased as an determinant of the vote in Iceland between 2007 and 2008. Examining voters' attachment to parties (party identification, party sympathy and perceived

left-right distance between parties and voters) it did have a lesser effect on to vote in 2009 compared to 2007.

Table 1. The change in determinants of vote choice from the 2007 to the 2009 election. Response variable: vote choice. Logistic regression.

	1 model	2 model	3 model
	Z	Z	Z
Does the party have the best policy about taxes *(0=stack party not mentioned, 1=stack party mentioned)*	**23.1***	**9.8***	**2.6***
Party competence *(0=stack party not mentioned, 1=stack party mentioned)*		**25.9***	**10.6***
Party identification *(0=none, 1=strong, 4 point scale)*			**10.1***
Party like / dislike *(0=dislike, 1=like, 11 point scale)*			**11.5***
Left-right distance *(0=left, 1=right, 11 point scale)*			**-6.9***
Socio-economic status *(y-hats)*	**20.5***	**7.1***	**3.1***
Election year (0=2007, 1=2009)	0.03	-0.9	**3.1***
Best tax policy*year	**3.4***	**2.1***	**2.0***
Party competence *year		**2.0***	**1.9+**
Party identification*year			**-2.2***
Party like / dislike*year			**-3.8***
Left-right distance*year		**2.2***	**2.1***
Interception	**-42.0***	**-21.7***	**-15.4***
N	10440	6750	6006
Nagelerke R Square	,34	,65	0,78
Cox & Snell R Square	,22	,41	0,50

*Entries are Z-scores. Significance levels: $+p<0.1$; $*p<0.05$; $**p<0.01$; $***p<0.001$. Program: SPSS 21.

Economy and the vote 2009

Examining vote choice in 2009, we focus on the effect of voters' blame of parties for the economic recession and which party they believed to have the best policy about economic recovery. We control for parties' perceived competence, party identification, party sympathy, left-right distance between voters and parties, and respondents' socio-economic status.

Table 2 lists the results of a binary logistic regression for vote choice in 2009. As can be seen, both retrospective and prospective evaluation of the parties determines the vote after

taking account of party identification, left-right distance, party sympathy and socio-economic status. The better the policy the party is believed to have on economic recovery, the more likely it is that the voter will cast his vote for that party, confirming hypothesis 4. The more a party was blamed for the crisis, the less likely it is that voters would choose that party, confirming hypothesis 5. Out of those two, voters' perception about what party has the best policy about economic recovery seems to have a stronger effect on the vote compared to blame assigned to the parties for the recession.

Table 2. Vote choice in 2009. Response variable: vote choice.

	1 model	2 model	3 model	4 model
	Z	Z	Z	Z
Does the party have the best policy about economic recovery *(0=stack party not mentioned, 1=stack party mentioned)*	**27.0*****	**26.5*****	**26.9*****	**15.3*****
Was the party blamed for the economic recession *(0=no blame, 1=much blame, 11 point scale)*		**-7.9*****	**-8.1*****	**-6.0*****
Party competence *(0=stack party not mentioned, 1=stack party mentioned)*			**7.0*****	**5.8*****
Party identification *(0=none, 1=strong, 4 point scale)*				**17.5*****
Party like / dislike *(0=dislike, 1=like, 11 point scale)*				1.2
Left-right distance *(0=left, 1=right, 11 point scale)*				**-9.4*****
Socio-economic status *(y-hats)*	**13.7*****	**15.3*****	**15.3*****	**10.6*****
Interception	**-28.6*****	**-25.5*****	**-25.6*****	**-15.1*****
N	4715	4468	4468	3850
Nagelerke R Square	,39	,41	0,42	0,62
Cox & Snell R Square	,24	,26	0,27	0,40

*Entries are Z-scores. Significance levels: $+p<0.1$; $*p<0.05$; $**p<0.01$; $***p<0.001$. Program: SPSS 21.

Discussion

In the 2009 election, the factor that seems to explain the vote to the greatest extent is what party voters believe to have the best policy about economic matters. Comparing voting behavior between the 2007 election and the 2009 election, economic matters have increased as determinants of the vote and voters' psychological attachment has weakened. It can be concluded that economic voting increased in Iceland due to the economic crisis that started in 2008. Another, maybe more interesting change, is that voters are more alienated from the parties in 2009. Party identification, party sympathy and left-right distance (perceived) between parties and voters, had a lesser effect on the vote in 2009 compared to 2007. We argue that this change is not just a general time-trend; it is a consequence of the political crisis that followed the economic crisis in late 2008.

The preliminary results in this paper indicate that it is not enough to focus on how economic objective factors influence the vote. One has to take into account subjective factors such as blame and faith in parties' competence to deal with the economy. In the Icelandic case the political system seems to have failed and it resulted in a political crisis with far reaching consequences for the party system in Iceland that are still evolving. For example there are now fourteen parties running for the general election in April this year, while the norm in the past has been four to six parties who do run for each election. On these notes we wonder whether the global credit crunch in Iceland set things in motion that will, when history will be written, regarded as a major change of the political system and Iceland as a modern western democracy?

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Appendix I

Socio-economic status 2007; the effect on vote-choice

	Social Demo-cratic Alliance	Progres-sive Party	Independ-ence Party	Left Green Move-ment	Liberal Party
	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
Gender (1=female, 0=male)	3,5		-5,0	3,6	-2,7
Age (18 to 80 years)					
Married (1=married / cohabitation, 0=not married)			-1,7		
Urban (1=big city / capital area) 0=rural):	2,9	-6,7			
Education (reference category=university)					
Primary education	-2,0	3,4		-2,4	
Secondary education			1,7		
Church attendance (reference category=at least once a month)					
Never		-2,0	-2,2	2,9	
Less than once a month				2,3	
Occupation (reference group= farmers / manual workers)					
Missing values				2,0	
Not in the workforce					
Non-manual workers			2,1		
Income (reference group=highest tercile)					
Missing values	-1,8				2,8
Lowest tercile			-2,9	2,6	1,7
Middle tercile			-2,9	2,0	2,6
Sector (reference group=public sector)					
Not in the workforce			2,3		
Private sector	-1,8		2,3		
Union membership (1=union member, 0=not a union member)			-2,9	1,7	
Intercept	-3,4	-2,2		-4,9	-4,2
N	1131	1145	898	1144	1145
Nagelkerke pseudo R2	,059	,180	,092	,087	,091

Note: entries are z-scores, that are significant with a p-value lower than 0.1.

Socio-economic status 2009; the effect on vote-choice

	Social Demo-cratic Alliance	Progres-sive Party	Independ-ence Party	Left Green Move-ment	Civic Movement
	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
Gender (1=female, 0=male)					
Age (18 to 80 years)	2,3				-2,2
married)					1,9
Urban (1=big city / capital area) 0=rural):	2,8	-5,6			3,0
Education (reference category=university)					
Primary education		1,9			
Secondary education					
Church attendance (reference category=at least once a month)					
Never					
Less than once a month					
Occupation (reference group= farmers / manual workers)					
Missing values					-2,2
Not in the workforce					
Non-manual workers					
Income (reference group=highest tercile)					
Missing values					
Lowest tercile					2,1
Middle tercile					
Sector (reference group=public sector)					
Not in the workforce	-1,8				
Private sector		2,0	2,3	-3,1	
a union member)					
Intercept	-4,1	-2,4			-2,5
N	943	943	943	943	943
Nagelkerke pseudo R2	,039	,098	,024	,053	,097

Note: entries are z-scores, that are significant with a p-value lower than 0.1.