

Electoral nationalization in a denationalized party system: the case(s) of Belgium

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1 Introduction.

The process of nationalization in Western European countries has been shown by several researches (among others: Caramani 1996, 2004; Lago & Montero 2009). All these studies use indicators that measure the nationalization of the party offer and/or the voter response. At times the nationalization of the party offer and the nationalization of the voter response have mistakenly been confused with each other, triggering a lively debate (Morgenstern and Potthoff 2005; Lago and Montero 2009). Confounding these two dimensions is a comprehensible oversight, since the observed dynamics concern the same process, which is voters responding to the party offer. Obviously, voter response has no chance to be (or become) nationalized if the party offer is not national. Yet, the two dimensions are not identical, as this paper will show by using the Belgian case. Moreover, since Belgium is one of the countries that Caramani (2004) uses as an example of re-territorialization of politics, we aim to verify whether it still has a fairly high level of voter response nationalization once we apply a different perspective on the proper content of the concept of nationalization.

As said, voter response can be nationalized only if the party offer is national as well. That is, at least one party should be present at the national level. This is actually the case in the other two countries in which Caramani (2004) found a pattern of re-territorialization: Italy and Britain. However, this condition does not apply to Belgium, where the re-territorialization is a mere political reality and not something to be proven, given that it has institutionally been split per language group since the 70s. This means that – with the exception of the Brussels region – Flemish and Walloon voters have a separate party offer according to their region/language and they do not have the possibility to vote for a party in the other region/of the other language group.

If we consider vote choice to be a response to the party offer, this means that a national question should be asked in order to have the possibility to get a nationalized answer. We argue that in the case of Belgium voter response is based on a regional party offer and thus by default an answer to a regional question, not a national one.

Therefore, although the party offer is currently completely regionalized, it still needs to be verified whether the nationalization of the party offer increased within the regions and, more interestingly, whether we can observe a process of nationalization within the language groups on the voter response level. In order to do this a longitudinal study of the nationalization levels of party offer and voter response at the national and regional levels is carried out.

2 What nationalization is and how we try to measure it.

In his eminent book about the nationalization of politics Caramani (2004) found a general nationalization trend in Western European countries over a period of about 100 years. In other words, he found that within almost each of the analysed countries the differences among the areas decrease as time goes by, and eventually disappear. That is, national politics substitutes local politics (Caramani 1996, 2004). By carrying out a comparative and longitudinal analysis, Caramani (2004) mostly focuses on the shift from the territorial to functional cleavages. In this sense, as he states himself, Caramani's (2004) argument finds its roots in the centre-periphery model proposed by Rokkan (1970): "Processes of nationalization are in the first place dynamic evolutions and transformations of [...] territorial structures" (Caramani 2004: 29), as the process of nationalization is connected with the state formation. However, there is another important concept involved in this process, that is the process of politicization, which consists in "the breakdown of the traditional systems of local rule through the entry of nationally organized parties" (Rokkan 1970: 227).

This quote highlights the key role played by mass national parties in the nationalization process. This is a fairly intuitive element: a nationalized electoral offer allows for a nationalized electoral answer. As long as the party were local the voters could not "behave national". This simple consideration leads us to two important aspects of this paper: 1) even if the two concepts are obviously linked, it is imperative to make a distinction (and to understand the interplay) between the nationalization of the party offer and the nationalization of voters' electoral behaviour; 2) there are particular cases, as Belgium, in which choosing what is the relevant party offer territory make not only a methodological but also (and most of all) a substantial choice (the latter point is going to be discussed in the section *Belgium*).

The first point, that is, making a clear distinction between the nationalization of the party offer and the nationalization of voters' electoral behaviour, it is something largely discussed in the literature. As Lago and Montero (2009) point out, because of its intrinsically multidimensional nature, the concept of the nationalization of the party system has suffered

from some ambiguity (Morgenstern and Potthoff 2005). The main conceptual difference consists in either linking or completely separating the parties from the voters' support. Therefore, if for Kasuya and Moenius (2008: 136) a party system is nationalized when "the vote share of each party is similar across geographic units", this does not apply for Caramani (2004), Jones and Mainwaring (2003) and Lago and Montero (2009), who claim that party systems' nationalization should solely refer to the party systems' structure. In order to provide a measure for the nationalization of the party system Caramani (2004) and Lago and Montero (2009) propose their own indexes. Caramani (2004: 61) employs the *territorial coverage*, and index that consists in the percentage of territorial units of a country where a party present a list. Lago and Montero (2009, 13) elaborate the *local entrant measure* (E^1), an index that varies between 0 and 1 in which different weights are assigned according to two elements: the number of votes received by a party at the local level with respect to the total of national valid votes and the number of seats gained with respect to the total number of seats. With regard to the nationalization of the vote, there are numerous ways in which it can be conceptualized and, consequently, measured. Claggett et al. (1984) propose a comprehensive classification that distinguish three different dimensions of nationalization: 1) the homogeneity of the elector support; 2) the source (or level) of political forces; 3) the type of the answer. The first dimension is the one employed by the aforementioned research of Kasuya and Moenius (2008): we can say that an election is nationalized when the support for the parties is homogenous across the units of a country. The second dimension refers to the tendency of the electorate to vote for national parties rather than local ones – this is a dynamic observed, for instance, in Italy (Russo and Dolez 2014). The third dimension implies a dynamic element: the election is considered to be a stimuli and the nationalization is operationalized as a uniform change between two elections.

Clearly, the first dimension refers to what happens within each single election, whilst the third one focus on the movement between two elections; the second can be operationalized in both ways, and Caramani (2004) highlights how Stokes (1965) and Katz (1973) used the third dimensions as an indicator for the second. Morgenstern et al. (2009) suggest a further classification in order to distinguish between the studies that focus on the *static* component of nationalization (Caramani 2004, Lago et Montero 2009, Bochsler 2010, Russo et al. 2013, Russo and Dolez 2014) and those that focus on the *dynamic* element (Stokes 1965, 1967; Alemán and Kellam 2008; Russo 2013).

Several measures have been built in order to measure the different dimension of the nationalization. With regard to the dynamic component, Morgenstern et al. (2013) identify

five main techniques: 1) the standard deviation at the district level (Butler et Stokes 1969, Johnston 1981; Kwato 1987); 2) the coattails correlation of the different level of elections (Converse 1969; Hoschka and Schunck 1978); 3) the *component-of-variance* model (Stokes 1965; Katz 1973; Bartels 1998; Morgenstern and Potthoff 2005); 4) the Alemán and Kellam algorithm (2008); 5) the multilevel model by Mustillo and Mustillo (2012).

Regarding to the static component, there is a even greater variety of indexes available to measure it. Bochsler (2010) divide them in three main families:

- 1) *indices of variance*: variation of the parties' territorial scores with respect to their national average (Rose and Urwin 1975; Rae 1967; Lee 1988).
- 2) *inflation measures*: comparison of the number of parties at the local and at the national level (Chibber and Kollman 1998; 2004; Cox 1999; Allik 2006; Moenius and Kasuya 2004; 2008).
- 3) *distribution coefficient*: measure proposed by Jones and Mainwaring (2003) based on the Gini coefficient of inequality (Gini 1921) being basically is inverse.

As the literature has highlighted (Bochsler 2010), all these measures have serious limits.

The first set of measures suffers of several problems (Bochsler 2010): the lack of upper limits, not taking into account the size of the territorial units considered and their dimension (whether they are equally large), the scale invariance (that is, the small parties have smaller deviations than large parties), the insensitivity of transfers (which is the result of the fact that the deviations are not weighted) (Firebaugh 2003; Bochsler 2010).

The second set of measures has been proved to be not fully reliable since they may lead to incorrect interpretations (Bochsler 2010).

Finally, with regard to the distribution coefficient, Bochsler (2010) highlights that due to the fact that this index does not take into account the size and the number of the territorial units, it might lead to biased estimates. However Bochsler (2010) overcomes these difficulties by developing the standardized Party Nationalization Score (sPNS), which is the index employed to compute the nationalization estimates in this paper.

3. Belgium

Together with Italy and Britain, Belgium is one of the few countries where Caramani (2004) observed a process of re-territorialisation of voting behaviour. Caramani (2004) highlighted the countries' specific reasons for these trends. With regard to Belgium, he specifies that:

“As in the case of Switzerland, in Belgium it is not the presence of regionalist parties that makes the system regionalized but rather the regionalization of the main parties themselves. The strength of the linguistic-ethnic cleavage in the Belgian case transformed each of the main parties in two different parties.”

Caramani 2004, p. 122.

Yet, precisely for the reasons Caramani highlighted, we think that with regard to the Belgian case deciding what is the relevant party offer territory does not only represent a methodological but also (and most of all) a substantial choice.

As earlier emphasized, the process of process of nationalization is connected with two main elements: the state formation and the process of politicization, that is “the entry of nationally organized parties” in the electoral offer (Rokkan 1970: 227).

3.1 The historical background the territorial divide

Belgium is a deeply divided society. Belgium is indeed cut in two by a line running from west to east. It is the line marking the limits of the linguistic influence of the Roman Empire. South of the line the vernacular languages are derived from Latin. In Belgium in particular the population living south of that old line speaks French (like in neighbouring France), while the population living in the north speaks Dutch (like in the neighbouring Netherlands). The Belgian state-building elite that put the new country on the map in 1830 by seceding from the Kingdom of the Netherlands did however speak French and made French the language of politics and all public affairs in the country. Gradually the inhabitants of the north (actually a small majority of 60% of the population) claimed that Dutch should be accepted as a second language and that the public authorities should use both Dutch and French in public administration and in education. The issue of the use of language was in the course of the 20th century settled by opting for a territorial logic, building on the fact that the population speaking either French or Dutch is indeed territorially concentrated (McRae 1983; Murphy, 1988; Witte and Van Velthoven, 2000; Deschouwer 2012). Three language areas were created: a Dutch-speaking, a French-speaking, a bilingual territory for the city of Brussels.

The creation of language territories settled but did not solve the conflict. Until today both the location of the boundary between the territories and its meaning are disputed. That is very much related to the position and status of Brussels. The capital city of the country is located north of the **linguistic** borderline and is thus originally a place where Dutch was spoken. It has however become to a very large extent a Francophone city and has constantly expanded since it became the capital city of Belgium.

Belgium is thus divided between north and south on the basis of the language spoken, with Brussels as a mixed area in the centre (but actually an enclave in the Dutch-speaking area). The linguistic difference is however not the only element dividing north and south. North and south developed quite rapidly into two quite distinct societies. Most important for this is the industrialization, that came quite early in Belgium and occurred mainly in the south. While the area between Charleroi and Liège rapidly developed heavy industry (coal, steel, glass), the north remained to a large extent quite rural. That meant for the south more urbanization, secularization and the development of a labour movement. The north remained as said rural and very much dominated by the Catholic Church. The difference between the two parts of the country was very visible when in 1894 there were for the first time elections with some sort of universal male suffrage (some men had a second or a third vote). At that time a majoritarian system was used, and all the seats in Flanders were won by the Catholic Party. The Labour Party was able to send MPs to parliament for the very first time, and all Socialist MPs were elected in Wallonia. Brussels then appeared to be the stronghold of the Liberal Party. That difference between the two parts of the country was there to stay. In 1961 for instance (now with a list PR system), the Christian Democrats won 50% of the votes in Flanders and 30% in Wallonia. The Socialists won 30% in Flanders and 46% in Wallonia.

For the parties themselves that was not easy to manage. The electoral competition had a different meaning in north and south. And that was before the parties themselves fell apart.

3.2 The falling apart of the party system

The falling apart of the Belgian parties and party system was a slow process that culminated in a real breakdown in the 1960s and 1970s. Already before WW2 the Catholic Party had functioned as a confederation of two quite autonomous wings. In 1945 it was recreated as a Christian Democratic party with a unitary structure. But it gradually again allowed for the creating of two 'wings', each able to focus more on its own region with its own electoral competition (story of the split: Deschouwer, 1993 (the Katz & Mair book) and Verleden 2009 in **Swenden & Maddens**).

Parties did split for two interacting reasons. One is explained above: competition in north and south is different, making it hard to develop one single statewide strategy. The other is deep disagreement on the institutional future of Belgium. Flanders defends a federation with two language communities, with Brussels belonging to Flanders (geographical and historical argument). Flanders also defends a hard language border that remains fixed, obliging the

Francophones moving to Flanders to adapt to the language of the territory. Francophone Belgium wants a federation with three components, which means that Brussels should not belong to Flanders but be a (Francophone) region on its own (do not look at the map but listen to the people). Two visions on the border: people should adapt to it (Flanders – seeking protection for the oppressed language) versus border should adapt to the people who are free to speak their language (typical position of dominant language).

The end of the process is a clean separation, but the process was rather chaotic. This explains the many ups and downs in the middle part of the graph. Below an idea of what happened.

Christian-Democrats. Crucial blow comes in 1968. Problem is Leuven university (located in Flanders but functioning also and strongly in French). University is split (Dutch courses remaining in Leuven and new Louvain-La-Neuve built in Wallonia). And the party also splits. In Brussels though former Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants goes on with a 'Belgian list'. In the end the Brussels section also splits and two new parties are end result (CVP and PSC).

Liberals. Very difficult process. Challenged in Brussels by FDF demanding regional autonomy for Brussels. Part of liberals associate with FDF, while others want to remain on their own. In Wallonia regionalist RW allies itself with (again only parts of) the liberals. Liberal family is totally fragmented during the 1970s, using different names in different districts, referring to varying alliances (or attempts to be on their own). Finally in 1979 a new party PRL is formed on Francophone side. Flemish part became autonomous PVV in 1971, but already in 1960s the Flemish liberals had their own lists in Brussels (Blue Lions) competing with the Francophone and unitary and FDF-allied liberals). Very difficult and chaotic process indeed.

Socialists. Try to remain united, but fail to do so. In 1978 Flemish wing is tired of being treated as the little brother (which it is electorally). Two new parties PS and SP are born.

Communists. Not that important. But does also split. Is electorally extremely small in Flanders, but has some strongholds in the industrial south. During late 1960s and 1970s also lots of internal debates in the communist camp, with the old Belgian PCB-KPB, but also list of 'Russia-oriented', 'China oriented' and 'Trotsky oriented' lists. This fragmentation adds to the chaos in the middle part of the graph.

After the falling apart of the existing parties, two party systems go their own way. New parties are created in each of the party system, independently from each other. Two green parties

enter the scene in the late 70s and early 80s. Two extreme right parties develop (VB and FN, with VB however very strong (up to 24% in Flanders in 2003) and FN weak and fragmented. The electorate of Flanders and Wallonia are thus now responding to a fully split party offer.

4. Method and Data.

In this paper we consider, and therefore measure, two conceptualizations of nationalization: the nationalization of the party offer and the nationalization of the electoral behaviour.

In order to estimate the nationalization of the party offer we employ the *territorial coverage* proposed by Caramani (2004). This index is simple and quite intuitive: it represents the percentage of territorial units in which each party presents a list with respect to the total territorial units of a country. The index is calculated by taking the average of these percentages.

With regard to the nationalization of the electoral behaviour there are many simple index it is possible to employ. One of the simplest and more intuitive ways to determine the static level of nationalization is to employ the indices of variance. These indices focus on the dispersion of values, that is, the dispersion of regional values around the national mean (Caramani 2004). However, they have several disadvantages (as we already mentioned in the Introduction): the lack of upper limits, the fact that these indexes do not take into account the size of the territorial units considered, whether they are equally large, the scale invariance (that is, small parties have smaller deviations than large parties) and the insensitivity of transfers (which is the result of the fact that the deviations are not weighted) (Firebaugh 2003; Bochsler 2010).

Because of these limits, we consider it useful to measure the nationalization levels of Belgium's Flanders' and Wallonia's Federal elections by employing a more robust measure: the Bochsler index (2010). This index is based on the *Party Nationalization Score* (PNS) (Jones and Mainwaring 2003), which is the inverse of the Gini index:

$$PNS = 1 - Gini = \Sigma (1 - Gi(P))pN = 1 - \Sigma (Gi(P))pN$$

The PNS varies between 0 and 1 and allows for easy comparison between the different levels of nationalization both in a synchronic (different levels of nationalization of parties within one election) and diachronic perspective (different levels of nationalization of a party over time). However, Bochsler (2010) identifies two problematic aspects of the PNS: this index does not take into account the size of territorial units across and within the country (it is obviously misleading to weight two areas with very different shares of voters in the same

way). The attempt to overcome these limits leads to the elaboration of the *Party Nationalization Score with weighted units* (PNSw), which allows the correct comparison among different nationalization levels of parties in a country having differently sized territorial units. However, it was shown that the PNSw could deliver biased estimates because the estimates are affected by the aggregation level of the electoral data (Bochsler 2010). In other words, when data at the regional level would be employed the PNSw could estimate homogenous levels of support, while when using a lower aggregation level (i.e. cities) the index could give a different final result, showing that the result obtained by using the data at the regional level was due to a large intra-regional variance.

The *standardized Party Nationalization Score* (sPNS) solves this limit by assuming that the heterogeneity measured at a lower territorial level, that is $PNS(n^2)$, corresponds to the squared heterogeneity measured at a higher level, that is $PNS(n)$ – where n is the number of units. Thus, we have that

$$PNS(n^2) = PNS(n)^2$$

A crucial step consists in introducing a logarithmic function in order to estimate the standardized level of party nationalization. The final result is the *standardized Party Nationalization Score* (sPNS):

$$sPNS = (1-G_E)^{(\log 10/\log E)} = (1-G_E)^{(1/\log E)} = PNS_E^{(1/\log E)}$$

The sPNS is a revised version of the PNS, which includes the raising of the equation at $1/\log(E)$, where the E represents the number of effective territorial units, inspired by the number of effective parties introduced by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Bochsler (2010) standardizes $sPNS = PNS_{10}$ under the given assumption for a fixed number of electoral units that he defines as ten.

The sPNS is the only existing index that does not show any variance when using different aggregation levels (Andreadis 2011).

With regard to the data, we use the electoral canton level, and we estimate the Territorial Coverage and the sPNS separately for Flanders, Wallonia and the two regions together. For reasons of simplicity we call the joint estimate of Flanders and Wallonia with the name *Belgium*. However, the canton of Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde. Until 2014 this is larger than Brussels region and comprises also 35 municipalities around Brussels and thus in Flanders. In this electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde the parties of both language groups compete with each other. This makes this canton different from all the others and poses several

concerns, both a substantive and a methodological. In fact, this canton is so different in terms of the composition of the population and the variety of the party offer that concern might rise when it has to be compared with all the other cantons, which have, as opposing, a way more homogenous population and only one party system. Moreover, the sPNS index has an inherent limit: the calculation can be done for maximum fifty parties at time, and in the case of the Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde canton this limit was largely exceeded for almost all the elections. In total, the electoral data of 198-194 cantons (the number varies across time) is analysed. Half of these cantons belong to the Flanders and the other half to Wallonia. We consider twenty-one Federal elections (1946 - 2010). The data are provided by the Belgian Interior Ministry.

5. Results

In order to highlight both the nationalization of the party offer and of the electoral behaviour two separate graphs and a table have been produced. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the trends while Table 1 offers a detailed overview of the indexes' values.

Figure 1 shows the Territorial Coverage in Flanders, Wallonia and Belgium. As it is possible to observe in Wallonia the party offer was always more nationalized than in the whole Belgium. This is also true for Flanders, with only one slight exception in 1958 (see Table 1). From 1961 onwards the Territorial Coverage in Belgium has always been consistently lower than in each of the two regions. The gap between Belgium and the two regions started to increase in the 80s, and in the last elections it grew noticeably.

Obviously, the aforementioned split of the party offer between the two regions explains this trend.

With regard to the comparison between the two regions it is interesting to notice that from 1981 onwards the Territorial Coverage in Flanders has always been higher than in Wallonia, with the only exception of the 2003 elections.

Figure 2 shows the standardized Party Nationalization Score in Belgium, Flanders and Wallonia. As for the previous figure, here it is possible to observe that the values of the index when considering the whole Belgium are lower than when considering one of the two regions. Apart for few elections in which the score is even (1954, 1980 and 1988) and one in which Wallonia has a slightly higher score (1969), the sPNS in Flanders is dependably higher than in Wallonia. The gap between the two regions is very small apart for the period going from 1974 to 1987, when Wallonia sPNS drops notably.

This is due to the structure of party support within the two regions, which is slightly different. Wallonia is characterized by the presence of two big parties (the *Parti Socialiste* and the *Mouvement Réformateur*) and a bunch of medium/small-sized parties, whilst in Flanders voter support is more homogeneously spread across about five parties.

Looking at Figure 2 it is possible to notice that ideally the trend can be divided in three periods: 1) 1946 – 1968: the sPNS values for the whole Belgium are lower than the ones in the two regions, but the gap is very small; 2) 1968-1987: the gap between the whole Belgium and the two regions starts to increase and goes through several fluctuations until it settles around 0.20 points difference, whilst the gap between Wallonia and Flanders starts to increase in 1974 and settles on a very small distance from Flanders' sPNS values (about 0.01 – 0.02 points); 3) from 1987 onwards: the big gap (0.20 points) between Belgium as whole and the two regions remains stable and so it does the small gap between the two regions.

The stability of the first period can mostly be explained by the aforementioned configuration of the big parties (as the Christian Democratic party) with a unitary structure, which presented candidates all over the country. By looking at Figure 1 it is possible to understand why it is extremely important to keep the level of analysis carefully separated, as the story Figure 1 tells is a story in which party offer was indeed characterized by a low level of nationalization (many small parties at the regional level). However, as Figure 2 shows, voter response was highly nationalized. This means that despite the presence of many small territorial parties, the majority of the voters voted for one of the big unitary parties.

The great instability of the second period reflects the process that culminated in the parties' real breakdown in the 1960s and 1970s. This is a period in which the split of parties by region began, and the Liberal family became totally fragmented by the using different names in different districts. On the ballots the split happened – but only partially - for the first time in 1968, when the Christian Democrats presented themselves for the first time as a new (split) party in Flanders and in Wallonia. From 1978 onwards one can say that voters in Flanders had only the new (split) Flemish parties on the ballot and Walloon voters only the Francophone parties. In fact, as Figure 2 shows, from 1978 onwards the nationalization for the whole of Belgium stays stable, whilst the voter response within the regions will only reach a stable (high) level of nationalization a few years afterwards (from 1987 onwards).

6. Conclusions

Significant progress has been made with regard to the study of nationalization, both in terms of theory (by proposing clear definitions and making clear distinctions) and at the technical

level (by introducing statistically refined indexes). Despite the broad body of literature now available on this topic, the study of nationalization can still benefit from further investigation and it can still provide interesting findings.

There are two main considerations that follow from our research findings. The first one is the confirmation that it is extremely important to maintain a conceptual division between the notions of nationalization of the party offer and nationalization of voter response. When looking at the two indexes it is obvious that two different stories are told, and two different dimensions are involved. The second one is more strictly connected to Belgium but it is equally theoretically relevant: when considering voter response it is essential to understand and consider what voters are responding to. The re-territorialization of the vote in Belgium that is claimed in other studies (among others: Caramani 2004) is a direct consequence of a divided party offer. In this sense, it can be argued that in the case of Belgium it has little sense to measure the nationalization of the voters' responses at the national level, since the "question" asked by the general elections is not national but regional. As we show, when voting behaviour in Belgium is put in the proper context, voter response is actually highly nationalized. But also beyond Belgium, one can argue that the nationalization of voter response is an answer to a question that elections implicitly ask. In other words: the Belgian case shows that it is not only the answer that can be national or local, but also the question. And this matters greatly when analysing the nationalization of voting behaviour.

As Rokkan (1970: 182) said "Our concern is not only with a process in *time* but also with a process in *space*". The nationalization of politics allows accomplishing both these goals, and it is a fascinating process and very interesting viewpoint to observe electoral behaviour. It also has the advantage to be one of the very few ways to include the dimension of space in the electoral research in a comparative way. For these reasons it is crucial to further investigate this process and its implications.

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TABLE AND FIGURES

Figure 1: Territorial Coverage in Belgium, Flanders and Wallonia




Figure 2: standardized Party Nationalization Score in Belgium, Flanders and Wallonia




Table 1: Territorial Coverage and sPNS values in Belgium, Flanders and Wallonia

year	Territorial Coverage			sPNS		
	Belgium	Flanders	Wallonia	Belgium	Flanders	Wallonia
1946	37,95	45,24	60,47	0,83	0,86	0,85
1949	36,94	46,37	52,28	0,86	0,88	0,87
1950	52,09	54,27	78,63	0,85	0,87	0,86
1954	28,56	45,99	32,90	0,83	0,85	0,85
1958	56,16	55,45	65,49	0,84	0,85	0,84
1961	33,42	42,18	44,19	0,86	0,89	0,87
1965	27,74	40,25	38,29	0,84	0,87	0,86
1968	28,31	41,69	38,82	0,83	0,86	0,88
1971	18,52	28,24	33,77	0,60	0,80	0,80
1974	26,25	45,23	41,28	0,75	0,89	0,83
1977	19,66	24,69	23,24	0,63	0,82	0,67
1978	23,47	27,50	32,04	0,64	0,87	0,74
1981	25,24	58,03	37,50	0,64	0,91	0,79
1985	29,63	48,24	42,94	0,64	0,90	0,81
1987	41,15	75,54	64,54	0,66	0,90	0,89
1991	29,14	60,95	47,44	0,65	0,88	0,88
1995	26,27	60,92	38,59	0,65	0,89	0,87
1999	26,71	55,59	55,02	0,66	0,90	0,89
2003	29,45	59,03	63,33	0,66	0,90	0,88
2007	35,03	75,82	65,52	0,66	0,90	0,89
2010	35,97	78,35	74,06	0,66	0,91	0,87