

Can Civic Education Make a Difference for Democracy? Hungary and Poland Compared

Florin N. Fesnic
Center for the Study of Democracy, Department of Political Science
“Babes-Bolyai” University Cluj, Romania
fesnic@fspac.ro

Prepared for presentation at the 3rd European Conference on Comparative Electoral Research
& Final Conference of the COST Action IS0806, “The True European Voter,”
24-27 April 2014, Aristotle University Thessaloniki, Greece

Abstract

Civic education can have a significant impact on democracy. I offer evidence for this assertion by comparing the effects of the widely different choices made in the early 1990's by two post-communist countries, Poland and Hungary. Initially, the effects of civic education were confined to teenagers; later, as generational replacement started to have an effect, we see an impact on the politics of the two countries. The success of civic education in Poland and its failure in Hungary is illustrated by the differences in youth's voting patterns: throughout the last decade, the vote of Polish youth has consistently been less authoritarian than the vote of older Poles, unlike in Hungary, where the pattern was reversed. Ultimately, these developments likely had an impact on democracy: we see democratic progress in Poland and democratic regression in Hungary.

For a long time, the role of civic education in democracies was almost absent from scholarly research. We are now witnessing a resurgence of interest in this topic, with scholars highlighting the crucial role played by factors that go beyond the content of civic education curricula, such as classroom climate, the mode of instruction, or the qualifications of teachers and the degree to which they endorse liberal values (Campbell, 2008; Dassonneville et al., 2008; Flanagan and Stout, 2010). Moreover, studies indicate that the effects of civic education are long-term; the civic skills and political values acquired in schools are retained into adulthood (Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008; Torney-Purta, 2004).

What we are missing so far are studies analyzing whether civic education makes a difference where it matters most – namely, at the polity level. Is the implementation of the practices recognized by scholars as having an impact on students’ civic knowledge, skills and values, also making an impact on democracy? In this study I analyze just that: I compare the important differences in the choices made by two post-communist democracies, Poland and Hungary, in their approach to civic education. While initially affecting only students, these choices were politically consequential in the long run, being a major contributor to the widely divergent democratic paths of the two countries in recent years.

The following section offers a brief summary of the recent literature on civic education, identifying the major determinants of its success. Then I discuss the reasons why scholars typically consider Poland and Hungary as similar cases, even within the group of post-communist countries, thus making the analysis of the effects of civic education in the two countries a ‘most similar cases’ design. After that, I present a comparison of the civic education curricula and modes of instruction in Poland and Hungary. In the light of what scholars have identified as best practices in civic education, this comparison shows that Poland has made better

choices. Furthermore, when compared to their Hungarian counterparts, the values of Polish teachers are more conducive to the development of liberal democratic values in their students. The results of a cross-national survey of eighth grade students confirm this expectation: Polish students appear significantly more democratically oriented than Hungarian students.

These differences matter. The evidence presented in this paper supports the notion that civic education is a good candidate for being a major contributor to the recent democratic divergence of Poland and Hungary. At the individual level, data from several surveys covering the legislative elections held throughout the last decade reveal a stark and permanent contrast between the youth of the two countries. In Poland, younger voters are less likely than older voters to support illiberal parties, unlike in Hungary, where the pattern is reversed. These results indicate the success of civic education in the first case and its failure in the second. Moreover, in Poland, as older generations are replaced by younger, more liberal generations, Polish democracy is consolidated. Conversely, in Hungary, as increasingly authoritarian generations of youth come of age, Hungarian democracy is backsliding.

Civic education and democracy

While the connection between education and democracy has long been established and never challenged (Almond and Verba, 1963, pp. 315-24; Deutsch, 1961; Lipset, 1959), the notion that *civic* education can play an important role for democracy is more controversial. For three decades (from the late 1960's to late 1990's), political scientists have ignored civic education, largely as the result of a single, but extremely influential, study, which concluded that the effects of civic education are negligible (Langton and Jennings, 1968). Things are changing; scholars have started to reconsider the role of civic education for democracy. If we now hear arguments

about the need for increased and improved civic education even in established democracies (Niemi and Finkel, 2006), such a need is all the more pressing in unconsolidated democracies, where processes of democratic socialization are much more fluid.

To be successful, civic education must go beyond merely encouraging political participation and developing civic skills; an equally important task is to shape students' values in a liberal democratic direction (Finkel, 2003). To this end, research has revealed the importance of understanding human rights and a familiarity with the international system (Torney-Purta, et al., 2008). While important, curriculum is just one of several major determinants of the success of civic education. Factors such as an open (i.e., democratic) class and school climate, active learning instructional methods, or the quality of teachers also play a significant role (Campbell, 2008; Dassonneville, et al., 2008; Flanagan and Stout, 2010). Recent research indicate that the results of civic education are lasting, being carried into adult life (Hooghe and Wilkenfeld, 2008; Torney-Purta, 2004).

Let us consider two countries making a simultaneous transition from authoritarianism to democracy. In the light of the aforementioned findings, one important choice facing such emerging democratic regimes concerns the policies regarding civic education. If just one of the two countries chooses what research reveals as being good practices (in terms of curriculum content, an open climate in the classroom, and active instructional methods), then we would expect its students to be better equipped for their future as citizens, having more liberal and democratic values. Additionally, if the teachers in the first country have better training and more interest in teaching civics, and, moreover, their values are better suited for a democratic society, then we would expect an even larger gap between the students of the two countries. The further expectation is that, once these students become adults, they will retain the values gained in civics

classes. Therefore, we would expect the young adults from the first country to show more support for liberal and democratic policies and parties.

My focus is on values, even though the impact of civic education goes beyond them, also affecting political participation and competence. However, in the absence of democratic and (especially) liberal values, increased levels of participation can do more harm than good. The remainder of the paper offers empirical evidence for the claim that civic education is a serious contender for inclusion in the list of factors that explain the divergent democratic trajectories of Poland and Hungary.

First, though, I start by justifying the comparison of these two countries as a ‘most similar cases’ design. Beyond their status as post-communist countries, they share a number of socioeconomic, cultural and political similarities, such as level of economic development (GNI/capita), degree of urbanization, ethnic homogeneity, literacy rate, or dominant religion.¹ While all these variables are frequently mentioned in the literature as important determinants of democracy, in this particular case they have very similar values for the two countries, and therefore their impact is controlled. One other important factor that we can add to this list is the peculiar kind of communism practiced in both countries, the so-called national-accommodative regime, which was characteristic for only a handful of communist countries. Scholars described this type of regime as offering better prospects for a full democratization, in contrast to the patrimonial communism that dominated in the majority of countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Kitschelt, et al., 1999; Gill, 2002). Other scholars have analyzed the configurations of party systems in the region, identifying three basic types: liberal, antiliberal, and mixed. Hungary and Poland were placed in the first category, the most conducive to a

democratic socialization of post-communist societies, due to “a general orientation of the major parties toward liberal democracy and Western integration” (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 39).

**Civic education in Hungary and Poland:
Who does what, how, and with what consequences?**

This section offers evidence for the existence of substantial differences in how civic education was taught in Hungary and Poland after 1989, then shows that these differences were consequential. The data is provided by CIVED 1999, a cross-national study of civic education practices and outcomes, conducted in 28 countries in the late 1990’s. The study collected information on variables relating to curriculum content, class environment and climate, teacher qualifications and values, and teaching practices. Table 1 offers a summary of some of the most significant findings.

Table 1

The results reveal important differences. Compared to their Polish counterparts (as well as teachers from most other countries), Hungarian teachers are significantly less likely to see civic education as an important subject for the society. When we look at teachers’ values, the differences are even starker. For instance, while virtually all Polish teachers think that they must tell their students to ignore a law that violates human rights, less than a third of Hungarian teachers endorse this notion. We also see important distinctions concerning the class climate and the style of instruction. Compared to Hungarian teachers, Polish teachers are significantly more likely to report the use of active learning instructional methods. These differences are further reflected in the students’ perceptions, with Polish students reporting that they perceive the

classroom climate as open for discussion, as well as being confident in participating in school, to a much greater extent than Hungarian students.

Case studies dedicated to the experience of civic education in Poland and in Hungary reinforce this general picture. In Poland, the discipline is taught by teachers with background in social studies and civics; they even have a journal called *Open Society*, dedicated to the subject of teaching civics and human rights (Tobin, 2010). In Hungary, teaching of this subject is done primarily by history teachers, who are neither properly trained, nor very interested in teaching civics (Mátrai, 1999).

Does all this make a difference for students? Previous research would lead us to expect, as a consequence of such widely divergent practices, that the civic skills, predicted civic participation and liberal-democratic values of Polish students would be better than those of Hungarian students. CIVED 1999 has data covering these issues as well, and the results indicate that this was indeed the case (Table 2).

Table 2

Whether we consider civic participation (being aware of the importance of voting, or expecting to participate in politics), civic skills (being able to identify a non-democratic government, or the importance of many organizations for democracy), or liberal and democratic values (making a contribution to solving problems in the community, or expressing positive attitudes toward migrants), Polish students' scores were well above the 28-countries mean. The scores of Hungarian students were a mirror image of those of Polish students, being systematically lower than the cross-national means for all three areas under consideration. The analysis in the following section shows that these differences are consequential for the evolution of democracy in the two countries.

The long-term consequences of civic education in Poland and Hungary: Micro- and macro-level effects

If the effects described in the previous section are long-term, being carried by former school students into their life as young citizens, this is good news for Poland and bad news for Hungary. In the first case, the success of civic education, coupled with generational replacement, will result in a more liberal and democratic citizenry and electorate; this, in turn, will increase support for liberal parties and policies and, consequently, will have a positive impact on democracy. Conversely, in Hungary, the long-term consequence of the failure of civic education will be an increasingly illiberal electorate, rising support for illiberal parties and policies, and democratic backsliding. Thus, we have observable implications that can be tested empirically, at both micro and macro levels.

At the micro level, I will test whether age is correlated with authoritarian voting (i.e., electoral support for authoritarian parties). In this context, the vote is a proxy for political values (voting for authoritarian parties is an indication of authoritarianism), but also an indirect determinant of democratic regression (which, in turn, is a consequence of the electoral success of authoritarian parties). The data for the analyses presented below comes from the first, the third, and the fifth rounds of the European Social Survey (2002, 2006, and 2010, respectively). In these surveys, in addition to age, respondents were asked to indicate what party they voted for in the previous parliamentary election. To operationalize authoritarianism, I used the results of the 2002, 2006 and 2010 waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey on Political Parties. In this latter survey, country experts estimated the position of all significant political parties on several policy dimensions, including GAL/TAN (Green-Alternative-Libertarian/Traditional-Authoritarian-

Nationalist). For each party included in the analysis, its score (the value of the dependent variable for all respondents who declared that they voted for that party) is the mean score assigned by experts to the party on the GAL/TAN dimension in that particular survey. For example, in 2010, the scores of Hungarian parties, on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 is ‘most extreme GAL’ and 10 is ‘most extreme TAN,’ ranged from 1.4 (the Greens, *Lehet Más a Politika*), to 9.4 (*Jobbik*). To assess the impact of age on authoritarian voting, I used linear regression analysis, regressing the Gal-TAN score of the party voted by the respondent on his or her age (Table 3).

Table 3

The analyses reveal significant and persistent cross-generational differences in both countries. For Poland, the positive sign of the coefficients shows that older generations are more authoritarian – that is, the older the respondent, the more ‘authoritarian’ he or she votes, on average. For Hungary, the negative sign shows the opposite: the voting patterns of younger Hungarians indicate that they are more authoritarian than older Hungarians. Substantively, the results are significant. For instance, in 2010, a 20 years old Hungarian was, on average, more authoritarian than a 70 years old Hungarian by 0.75. This is a substantial difference, larger than the 2010 GAL-TAN distance between the Austrian Conservatives (*ÖVP*) and the radical Austrian *BZÖ*, which was just 0.6.

These elections cover sufficiently long spans of time (from 2001 to 2007 in Poland, from 2002 to 2010 in Hungary) to reduce the influence of idiosyncratic factors such as economic conditions or political scandals. The three Polish elections were won, in turn, by Social-Democrats (the *SLD*) in 2001, then by Conservatives (*PiS*) in 2005, and then by Liberals (*PO*) in 2007. In Hungary, the Conservatives (*Fidesz*), who in 2002 were the incumbents, lost the election, being replaced by Socialists. The Socialists won again in 2006, and then lost to *Fidesz*

in 2010. Thus, while the economic and political context of these elections varied widely, the cross-generational (and cross-country) differences in support for authoritarian parties remained constant.

Moreover, a peculiar feature of the party systems of the two countries makes these results particularly significant: their primary axis of competition is GAL-TAN. That is, while major parties differ little in their position along the economic (left-right) dimension, they place themselves in widely divergent positions on the liberal-democratic versus authoritarian (GAL-TAN) dimension. This is especially relevant in the case of Hungary, where seeing the young voting more authoritarian than older generations comes as a big surprise. Can it be the case that this vote is driven by something else, such as economic (left-right) preferences, rather than authoritarianism? In the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the distance between the major Hungarian parties of the left (MSZP) and right (Fidesz) on the economic dimension was only 0.77 (on a 0-10 scale), while the distance between them on the GAL-TAN dimension was 4.35, more than five times larger.² In such circumstances, when there are hardly any differences between parties on economic policies, but very large differences in terms of democratic-authoritarian positions, voters have little reason to base their choice on the former, and must instead rely on the latter.

Did the cross-generational differences between the two countries, observed at the micro level, have eventually become consequential at the macro (polity) level? Throughout the 1990's and up to mid-2000's, scholars described the two countries as equally democratic. If anything, when Hungary's democratic scores were not equal to Poland's (as they were in Freedom House's reports up until 2012), they were higher (for example, World Bank's Voice and Accountability and Rule of Law scores from 1996 to 2008-2011) (Figure 1).

Figure 1

The relative evolution of the Voice and Accountability and Rule of Law scores in the two countries (Poland score minus Hungary score) indicates that, in the last few years, we are witnessing a process of democratic consolidation in Poland, in stark contrast to Hungary, where we see democratic backsliding. This is not a singular assessment: in 2012, Freedom House has downgraded Hungary's score for Civil Liberties; yet another recent classification of world regimes placed Poland in the most democratic category (liberal democracy), while Hungary was placed in the second category (Møller and Skaaning, 2013). Thus, we have a consensus among scholars that, in recent years, the democratic trajectories of the two countries have been widely divergent.

A lesson for policy-makers in new democracies

The question raised by this paper is whether civic education can make a difference for democracy. The comparison of the effects of civic education in Poland and Hungary indicates that it can. The two countries are quite similar in many significant respects, even within the group of post-communist countries. They differ, though, in terms of their choices regarding civic education immediately after their transition to democracy. In the light of the findings of research on civic education policies and their effects, Poland's choices appear more inspired than Hungary's; the analysis of CIVED 1999 data strongly suggests that these choices were indeed consequential. Firstly, the civic skills, the predicted participation, and the liberal-democratic values of Polish students were superior to those of Hungarian students. Moreover, several public opinion surveys conducted throughout the last decade show that these differences are long-lasting. In Poland, young citizens are less authoritarian than older generations. In Hungary, the

pattern is reversed: younger generations are more authoritarian. This indicates not just the success of civic education in Poland and its failure in Hungary, but also the persistence of its effects, which are retained by former students into adulthood.

The last part of the analysis indicates that, ultimately, these developments likely had an impact on democracy: we see democratic progress in Poland and democratic regression in Hungary. It is also worth mentioning that the Voice and Accountability and Rule of Law scores indicate that Hungary's downward trend began around 2006, a full electoral cycle before Viktor Orbán's return to power. This is further indication that the root cause of Hungary's current problems goes well beyond the problem of a particular leader or political party. Orbán is at least as much a symptom as he is the cause of Hungary's democratic problems, which are largely the result of the failure of democratic socialization of Hungarian youth after 1989.

Unquestionably, there are other variables that play an important role for democracy – in Hungary, Poland, or any other emerging democracy. But this paper offers support for the notion that civic education can also play an important role. Hence, in addition to political, economic, social and institutional reforms (including a general reform of the educational system), any democratically-minded reformers must consider the crucial role of civic education. Failure to do so can jeopardize the democratic prospects of their polity, opening the door for authoritarian leaders. It is a lesson that Hungarian democrats have learned the hard way.

**Table 1. Civic education practices and teacher characteristics:
Hungary and Poland compared**

	Poland	Hungary	Mean*
Teachers' values			
<i>Percent teachers who agree that...</i>			
Teaching civic education matters a great deal for our country	92	70 [▼]	89.0
<i>Percent teachers who agree that they must teach the importance of...</i>			
Participating in peaceful protests	79	64 [▼]	77.5
Ignoring a law that violates human rights	100 [△]	30 [▼]	73.7
Instruction			
<i>Teachers' reports on frequency of instructional methods (0-1 scale)**</i>			
Group work	0.70 [△]	0.43 [▼]	0.50
Projects	0.63 [△]	0.37 [▼]	0.43
Role play	0.57 [△]	0.30 [▼]	0.37
Students' perception of class climate (standardized)			
Have confidence in participation at school	10.5 [△]	9.4 [▼]	10
Perception of an open classroom climate for discussion	10.4 [△]	9.4 [▼]	10

*The mean represents the average of the scores for the 28 countries in the survey

**The original scale was one to four

[△]Significantly above the 28 countries mean (more than two standard deviations)

[▼]Significantly below the 28 countries mean (more than two standard deviations)

Source: Torney-Purta, Judith, et al. 2001. *Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic knowledge and engagement at age fourteen*. Amsterdam: IEA.

**Table 2. The consequences of civic education:
Students' skills, participation and values in Poland and Hungary**

	Poland	Hungary	Mean*
<i>Percentage who were able to...</i>			
Identify a non-democratic government	65 [△]	45 [▽]	53
Identify the importance of many organizations in a democracy	78 [△]	46 [▽]	69
<i>Percentage that agree or strongly agree that they have learned...</i>			
To be concerned about what happens in other countries	74	57 [▽]	72
To contribute to solving problems in the community	75 [△]	45 [▽]	68
About the importance of voting in national and local elections	70 [△]	52	55
<i>Attitudes and perceptions (standardized)</i>			
Positive attitudes toward immigrants	10.6 [△]	9.5 [▽]	10
Expected participation in politics	10.5 [△]	9.8 [▽]	10

*The mean represents the average of the scores for the 28 countries in the survey

[△]Significantly above the 28 countries mean (more than two standard deviations)

[▽]Significantly below the 28 countries mean (more than two standard deviations)

Source: Judith Torney-Purta, et al. 2001. *Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic knowledge and engagement at age fourteen*. Amsterdam: IEA.

Table 3. Age and authoritarian vote: Poland versus Hungary

<i>Election (parliamentary)</i>	Poland			Hungary		
	b	s.e.	p	b	s.e.	p
2001-2 ¹	.011	.005	.047	-.022	.004	.000
2005-6 ²	.006	.003	.058	-.010	.003	.001
2007-10 ³	.017	.004	.000	-.015	.004	.000

The results (b's) are unstandardized coefficients of linear regression; s.e. – standard errors; p – statistical significance

¹Poland 2001; Hungary 2002

²Poland 2005; Hungary 2006

³Poland 2007; Hungary 2010


Data sources:

European Social Survey (2002, 2006 and 2010) *Hungary: Documents and Data Files* [online]. The European Social Survey. Available from <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/country.html?c=hungary> [Accessed November 1, 2013].

European Social Survey (2002, 2006 and 2010) *Poland: Documents and Data Files* [online]. The European Social Survey. Available from <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/country.html?c=poland> [Accessed November 1, 2013].

Hooghe, L., et al. (2002, 2006 and 2010) *Political Parties: Chapel Hill Expert Survey* [online]. Available from http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/data_pp.php [Accessed November 1, 2013].

Figure 1. The relative evolution of voice & accountability and rule of law scores in Poland and Hungary, 1996-2012



Data source: World Bank (2013) Worldwide Governance Indicators [online]. Available from <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq> [Accessed November 1, 2013].

Notes

1. 2012 GNI per capita (2005 PPP \$): Hungary 16,088, Poland 17,776; percent urban population (2012): Hungary 69.9, Poland 60.8; percent majority ethnic group in the total population: 93 in Hungary, 94 in Poland; man years of schooling (2012): Hungary 11.7, Poland 10.0; dominant religion: Roman Catholic (both countries); 2012 Human Development Index: Hungary 0.831, Poland 0.821; 2012 Non-income Human Development Index: Hungary 0.874, Poland 0.851. Data source: United Nations Development Programme, *2013 Human Development Report: The Rise of the South* (UNDP, 2013).

2. We see the same results (i.e., a small left-right distance between the two parties, coupled with a large GAL-TAN distance) in the previous waves of the same survey (2002 and 2006); see also Benoit and Laver (2006, p. 214) for similar results.

References

Almond, G., and Verba, S. (1963) 'Education and Political Culture', in G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 315-24.

Campbell, D. E. (2008) 'Voice in the Classroom: How an Open Classroom Climate Fosters Political Engagement Among Adolescents', *Political Behavior* 30 (4), 437-54.

Dassonneville, R., Quintelier, E., Hooghe, M., and Claes, E. (2012) 'The Relation Between Civic Education and Political Attitudes and Behavior: A Two-Year Panel Study Among Belgian Late Adolescents', *Applied Developmental Science* 16 (3), 140-50.

Deutsch, K. W. (1961) 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', *American Political Science Review* 55 (3), 493-516.

Finkel, S. E. (2003) 'Can Democracy Be Taught?', *Journal of Democracy* 14 (4), 137-51.

Flanagan, C. A., and Stout, M. (2010) 'Developmental Patterns of Social Trust Between Early and Late Adolescence: Age and School Climate Effects', *Journal of Research on Adolescence* 20 (3), 748-73.

Gill, G. (2002) *Democracy and Post-Communism: Political change in the post-communist world*. London and New York: Routledge.

Hooghe M., and Wilkenfeld, B. (2008) 'The stability of political attitudes and behaviors across adolescence and early adulthood: A comparison of survey data on adolescents and young adults in eight countries', *Journal of Youth and Adolescence* 37 (2), 155-67.

Kitschelt, H., Mansfeldova, Z., Markowski, R., and Toka, G. (1999) *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Langton, K. P., and Jennings, M. K. (1968) 'Political socialization and the high school civics curriculum in the United States', *American Political Science Review* 62 (3), 852–67.

Lipset, S. M. (1959) 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', *American Political Science Review* 53 (1), 69-105.

Mátrai, Zs. (1999) 'In Transit: Civic Education in Hungary', in J. Torney-Purta, J. Schwille, J., and J.-A. Amadeo (eds.), *Civic education across countries: Twenty-four national case studies from the IEA Civic Education Project*. Amsterdam: IEA, pp. 333-70.

Møller, J., and Skaaning, S.-E. (2013) 'Classification of the World's Regimes in 2012', *Journal of Democracy* [online], 24, 4. Available from: <http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/MollerTable-24-4.pdf> [Accessed November 21, 2013].

Niemi R. G., and Finkel, S. E. (2006) 'Civic Education and the Development of Civic Knowledge and Attitudes', in L. E. Harrison and J. Kagan (eds.), *Developing Cultures: Essays on Cultural Change*. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 77-94.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2007) 'Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe', in J. T. Checkel (ed.), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 31-62.

Tobin, K. (2010) 'Civic Education in Emerging Democracies: Lessons from post-Communist Poland and Romania', *Journal of Research in International Education* 9 (3), 273–88.

Torney-Purta, J. (2004) 'Adolescents' Political Socialization in Changing Contexts: An International Study in the Spirit of Nevitt Sanford', *Political Psychology* 25 (3), 465–78.

Torney-Purta, J., Wilkenfeld, B., and Barber, C. (2008) 'How Adolescents in 27 Countries Understand, Support, and Practice Human Rights', *Journal of Social Issues* 64 (4), 857–80.